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ARGUMENT
In their opposition brief, the Smedsruds argue the trial court was correct when it
applied the "flexible and reasoned" approach when determining that they were the
"successful party" in the underlying litigation.

The Smedsruds further argue that

statutory amendment in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(3) should be applied retroactively in
this matter.

Finally, the Smedsruds contend the trial court correctly ruled that the

garnishment proceeding in this matter was proper.
Pochynok Company's position is that the trial court erred when it used the
"flexible and reasoned" approach, rather than the "simple" or "net judgment" approach
when determining which party was the "successful party" in the underlying litigation.
Further, it is Pochynok Company's position that the amendment to § 38-1-18(3) is not
applicable in this matter. Lastly, Pochynok Company contends the trial court erred when
it determined the construction funds in Pochynok Company's bank account were funds
that were subject to garnishment by the Smedsruds.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE FLEXIBLE AND
REASONED APPROACH RATHER THAN THE "SIMPLE" OR "NET
JUDGMENT" APPROACH WHEN DETERMINING THE SUCCESSFUL
PARTY IN THIS MATTER
1 ne jury veraict in mis matter states in relevant part as follows:
We, the jury, duly empaneled in the above-entitled matter, hold as
follows in the above entitled action:

i

1.
Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in
favor of plaintiff J. Pochynok Company, Inc., and against defendants
Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, in the amount of $7076.56.
2.
Based on the law as it has been explained to us, we find in
favor of defendants Gregory and LouAnn Smedsrud, and against plaintiffs
J. Pochynok Company, Inc., in the amount of
.
(R. 354-355)
Thus, the jury in this matter explicitly found in favor of Pochynok Company. The
jury found that the Smedsruds were entitled to nothing in relation to their claims. The
jury could have entered any amounts on the jury verdict fonn. It could have awarded
Pochynok Company $50,000.00 in relation to its claims, and the Smedsruds $42,923.44
in connection with their claims, which would have tended to show both parties were at
least partially successful with their claims. The jury, however, did not do so. The jury
awarded Pochynok Company, and did not award the Smedsruds anything.
As was cited in Pochynok Company's opening brief, Utah case law clearly
explains that when plaintiff sues defendant, and plaintiff is awarded judgment, plaintiff
has prevailed.

If defendant successfully defends and avoids an adverse judgment,

defendant has prevailed.1

In the present case, Pochynok Company was awarded

judgment, the Smedsruds were not. Accordingly, Pochynok Company is the prevailing
party.
Contrary to this position, the Smedsruds cite the Utah Court Court of Appeals
decision of Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct.

1

See, AX. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 41 P.3d 92 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)
and Mountain States Broad Co. v. Neale, 793 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

App. 1990) in support of their position that they are the prevailing parties in this matter.
Defendants assert that the Occidental court, "...determined that, even though plaintiff
obtained a judgment against Defendants, they were the 'prevailing parties' by the reason
of the nominal amount thereof, and awarded them costs and attorneys' fees."

This

statement is misleading and does not accurately reflect the holding in Occidental.
In Occidental the plaintiff, Occidental Federal Savings Bank ("Occidental")
conducted a trustee's sale of property owned by the defendants, the Mehrs. At the
trustee's sale, the only bid was from Occidental in an amount of $983,086.33.
Occidental's purchase at this price resulted in a deficiency, stipulated to at trial, of
$7,339.44. After filing an action to collect the deficiency, Occidental claimed that the
earlier trustee's sale was procedurally defective. Subsequently, Occidental sent a new
notice a sale to the Mehrs, thereby scheduling a second trustee's sale. At this second
sale, Occidental again was the only bidder, bidding only $400,000, in contrast to its
$983,086.33 bid from the earlier sale.
Following the second sale, Occidental amended the complaint in its deficiency
action to reflect the deficiency created by the second trustee's sale. In defense of the
amended claim for a deficiency judgment, the Mehrs argued that the first trustee's sale
was valid and that the second sale had no effect. The trial court concluded that the first
trustee's sale was valid and entered judgment against the Mehrs for the stipulated
$7,399.44 deficiency resulting from the first sale. The trial court also awarded attorney
fees and costs of $4,451.98 to the Mehrs.

Occidental appealed asserting that the trial court erred in granting the Mehrs
attorney fees as it was the prevailing party. Occidental claimed that because judgment
was entered in its favor, it was the prevailing party in the lawsuit, and that it should be
entitled collect fees. In response to Occidental's argument, the Mehrs stated that while a
judgment was entered against them, they prevailed on the only contested issue at trial,
i.e., the validity of the first trustee's sale.
In evaluating these facts, the appellate court stated:
The only contested issue at trial was whether the deficiency would
be based on the December sale or the April sale. At trial, Occidental's
calculations of the deficiency resulting from the December 1985 trustee's
sale, i.e., $7,300, were stipulated to by the Mehrs. The remainder of the
litigation involved Occidental's efforts to establish its claim to a deficiency
resulting from the invalid trustee's sale in April 1996. The Mehrs were
successful in defending against Occidental's claim for a $600,000
deficiency based on the April sale. The Mehrs successfully demonstrated
the validity of the December sale, thus the deficiency judgment was for the
stipulated amount of $7,339.44. In light of the circumstances involved and
the issues contested at trial, the trial court did not err in granting the Mehrs
attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party.
Id. At 222.
The Occidental case is clearly distinguishable from the case presently before this
Court.

In Occidental, the court determined that the Mehrs prevailed on the only

contested issue at trial. All other facts were stipulated to. As such, the appeals court did
not decide that the Mehrs were the prevailing party because ofthe disparity between the
$600,000.00 claim and the $7,300.00 judgment, but rather, the Mehrs were deemed the
prevailing party because they established that the earlier trustee's sale was valid. In
effect, there was only one contested claim, and the Mehrs prevailed on that contested

claim. The "flexible approach" approach was needed in Occidental because even though
there was a stipulated judgment for the plaintiff, the defendants prevailed on the only
contested claim.
In the case presently before this court, however, plaintiff prevailed on both
contested issues at trial. The jury determined that defendants owed plaintiff money, and
the jury determined that the plaintiff did not owe defendants money.
The Smedsruds also contend language in the recent Utah Supreme Court decision
of R.T. Nielson Company v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119 (Utah 2002) supports its position. While
the Smedsruds correctly cite the Nielson opinion, the following passage is omitted:
The court of appeals, when presented with a similar agreement awarding
attorney fees to the prevailing party, noted that "under the provision at
issue, there can be only one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and
defendant are awarded money damages on claims arising from the same
transaction." Id. At 556. In support, the court of appeals cited two of our
cases, Checketts v. Collings, 78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d 950 (1931), and Trayner v.
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984). Checketts states that "[tjhere can be
but one prevailing party in an action at law to recover a money judgment."
78 Utah 93, 101-02, 1 P.2d 950, 953 (citation omitted). In Trayner,
however, we noted that both parties to a contractual claim may be entitled
to attorney fees as the prevailing party where the contractual provision
awarding attorney fees does not mention "prevailing party" and each party
is successful on one or more claims. 688 P.2d at 858. The court of appeals,
in a series of footnotes in Mountain States Broadcasting Co., noted the
difficulty in determining which party prevails in complicated cases
involving multiple claims and parties, mentioned that in some
circumstances both parties may be considered to have prevailed, and
expressed the "need for a flexible and reasoned approach to jdeciding J n
particular cases who actually is the 'prevailing party.5" 783 P.2d at 556 n.7~
10.
The case presently before the court is not a complicated case involving multiple
claims and parties, nor is it a case where both parties prevailed. Again, the jury only

awarded Pochynok Company. As such, the trial court erred when it determined the
Smedsruds prevailed in the litigation.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THE FUNDS IN
POCHYNOK COMPANY'S BANK ACCOUNTS WERE SUBJECT TO
GARNISHMENT BY THE SMEDSRUDS
The Smedsruds argue that the trial court correctly found that certain funds in
Pochynok Company's bank account were properly garnished. The Smedsruds further
contend that Pochynok Company's objection to the gamishment suffered from both
procedural and substantive defects.
POCHYNOK COMPANY PRESENTED CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
AT THE GARNISHMENT HEARING WHICH ESTABLISHED THE FUNDS IN
POCHYNOK COMPANY'S ACCOUNT WERE NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT
On October 4, 2002, Pochynok Company's counsel contacted the trial court's
clerk regarding the trial court's procedure for the October 7, 2002 Objection To
Garnishment Hearing (''Garnishment Hearing").

Pochynok Company's counsel was

informed that the hearing would be conducted in a similar fashion to a law and motion
hearing, and from this conversation Pochynok Company's counsel understood that
evidence should be presented by way of proffer. (R. 810-812)
At the Garnishment Hearing, Pochynok Company's counsel presented certain
documents which established that the money garnished by defendants was deposited into
Pochynok Company's account by Pochynok Company's then current project owner,
Steve Young, and that those funds were specifically designated to be paid to entities

which had completed work on the Steve Young project.

(See, Brief Of Appellant,

Statement Of Facts, Tf^[ 10-18)
In response to Pochynok Company's counsel's presentation, the Smedsruds'
counsel made several arguments and assertions regarding Pochynok Company's bank
account, which arguments and assertions were also offered by way of proffer.

The

Smedsruds' counsel further stated that Pochynok Company had not established by clear
and convincing evidence that Pochynok Company did not own the funds that were
garnished from plaintiffs account, arguing that Pochynok Company's counsel had
provided un-sworn testimony. The Smedsruds' counsel also misstated facts regarding the
timeliness of Pochynok Company's Request For Hearing on the garnishment issue.
(Although the trial court ruled in favor of the Smedruds on the timeliness issue,
apparently based upon the Smedruds' counsel's representations, counsel later admitted
that his representations were made in error.)
Pochynok Company's counsel was not afforded an opportunity by the trial court to
respond to the Smedsruds' counsel's arguments and misstatements.

In fact, John

Pochynok, Pochynok Company's president, was present at the hearing, and was available
and prepared to testify regarding the documents that were submitted to the Court. (R.
810-812)
The Smedsruds' position that plaintiff presented no evidence at the Garnishment
Hearing is disingenuous. In fact, even the Ruling On Writ Of Garnishment prepared by
the Smedruds' counsel states, "The Court having heard presentations of counsel, having
reviewed all submittals of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises and good
7

cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:55 (italics added) (R. 776-778)
Thus, the ruling signed by the trial court establishes that the submittals of counsel were
considered by the trial court.

Accordingly, it must be determined whether the

information provided to the trial court at the Garnishment Hearing established by clear
and convincing evidence that the funds in Pochynok Company's account were not owned
by Pochynok Company, and therefore not subject to garnishment by the Smedsruds.
The facts and documents supporting Pochynok Company's position that it did not
own the funds garnished by the Smedsruds are set forth in record. (R. 748-769) These
facts and documents clearly demonstrate that the construction funds in Pochynok
Company's account at the time of the garnishment were deposited by Steve Young, the
project owner of Pochynok Company's then current project

The facts and documents

further establish the bank account that was garnished was established solely for the Steve
Young project. When the money was wired into Pochynok Company's account, direction
was given to Pochynok Company by Steve Young on how to disburse the construction
funds. Pochynok Company had in fact disbursed the funds (by mailing checks to the
parties Steve Young directed to be paid) before the funds were garnished by the
Smedsruds.
The question of error in this matter relates to the character of Pochynok
Company's legal interest in the construction funds at the time the garnishment took place.
The Smedsruds contend that, "The funds, once in the account, were J. Pochynok
Company's alone, to do with as it pleased, but subject to competing obligations,
including the judgment in favor of Defendants and Appellees." The Smedsruds assertion
Q

is simply not true. The specific purpose of the construction funds (as set forth by the
project owner) was to pay certain subcontractors who had completed work on the project.
The funds were not a gift to Pochynok Company. The funds were not payment for
Pochynok Company's work on the project. The construction funds in the account were
trust funds that were held in Pochynok Company's account to be used to pay
subcontractors. As such, the funds were not subject to garnishment.
As has been established by the Utah decision of Peterson v. Peterson, 571 P.2d
1360 (Utah 1977), the fact that money is deposited into a checking account, does not
necessarily mean that the money is owned by the owner of that checking account. In this
case, it is undisputed that the money that was garnished in this matter was deposited into
plaintiffs account by Steve Young, and that money was to be used, and was attempted to
be used, to pay for work that had been completed on Steve Young's project. The money,
however, was garnished before payment checks had cleared Pochynok Company's
account. The money that was garnished was Steve Young's money.
CONCLUSION
The threshold issue in this matter is which party is the "successful party" as is
defined by Utah law. Pochynok Company, as the only party awarded by the jury, should
have designated by the trial court as the successful party at trial. As the successful party,
Pochynok Company is entitled to recover its costs and fees pursuant to Utah statute.
Moreover, the trial court erred when it allowed the garnishment of non-owned funds from
Pochynok Company's account.

Based upon the foregoing, Pochynok Company

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the ruling of the trial court that the

Smedsruds were the successful party herein, reverse the trial court's ruling that § 38-118(3) should be retroactively applied in this matter, and reverse that trial court's ruling
that the garnishment herein was proper.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 ^

day of June, 2003.
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Anthony R. Martinet
Brett D. Cragun
Attorneys For Plaintiff/Appellant
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